The notion of a plurality of historical times or temporalities is now established as one of the most significant recent tendencies in the philosophy and theory of history, traversing the boundaries between otherwise conflicting paradigms of research.2 One feature shared by most of these approaches is a commitment to the deepening of the 'spatialisation' of the notion of historical time itself. Rather than a depiction of discrete events 'punctuating' a linear temporal continuum, organised classically according to a 'before' and 'after' , the pluralisation of distinct and irreducible historical times seems to configure them in more complex spatial arrangements, in either 'archaeological' or 'cartographical' models. An archaeological reconfiguration of time is thematised explicitly in the work of Koselleck, who has provided one of the most sophisticated methodological reflections on the consequences of thinking the plurality of times with his notion of 'temporal layers' [Zeitschichten] .3 Arguably, 1 q 8, §232, p. 1087. References to Gramsci's Prison Notebooks [Quaderni del carcere] follow the internationally established standard of notebook number (q), number of note ( §), followed by page reference to the Italian critical edition (Gramsci 1975) . The English critical edition of the Prison Notebooks, edited by Joseph A. Buttigieg, now comprises three volumes (Gramsci 1992 (Gramsci , 1996 (Gramsci , 2007 , containing Notebooks 1-8; notes included in those volumes can be located according to the notebook and number of note. 2 For an overview of different theories of temporal plurality or multiplicity, see Offenstadt 2011
and for a collection of recent interventions, Bevernage and Lorenz 2013. The notions of 'times' and 'temporalities' are used interchangeably throughout this text, following Althusser's usage in Reading Capital. Other approaches, however, have insisted upon distinguishing between them, with 'time' posited as the condition of possibility of (the experience of) 'temporality' , which is then understood in a phenomenological sense. These approaches, however, are ultimately premised upon the type of philosophy of the subject that this text in part aims to place in question. 3 As Koselleck acknowledges, 'When we speak about time, we are reliant on metaphors. For however, such a three-dimensional model is also operative in one or another form in approaches as different from each other as Bloch's study of the unevenness of German modernisation, 'classical' structuralism's distinction between synchrony and diachrony, and the Annales School's investigation of the overlayering of varying durées. 'Cartographical' models of plural temporality, on the other hand, seem to imply a dispersion of time in two dimensions, as different temporalities scattered across a plane, lying alongside each other in relations of indifference or antagonism.4 Chakrabarty's distinction between 'History 1' and 'History 2' , or histories 'posited by capital' and those external to or autonomous from it, but existing as 'subaltern pasts' within the 'same' time, Zerubavel's analysis of 'time maps' , or Hölscher's recent proposal of the notion of 'time gardens' as a 'common ground for historical narratives, for keeping history as a universal reality together' , would seem to be examples of such approaches.5
In all these cases, however, the spatial metaphors unify just as soon as they have divided; the pluralisation of irreducible historical times without common measure encounters, in a formulation now most often associated with Koselleck, the paradoxical notion of a 'contemporaneity of the non-contemporary' [Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen].6 Partially anticipated by Bloch,7 but with deeper roots in the post-Hegelian German tradition, Koselleck's formulation aims to theorise the way in which different temporal layers emerge, or 'occur [sich ereignen]' , 'at different times [nicht alles zu gleicher Zeit]' , 'arising out of completely heterogeneous life contexts' .8 Nevertheless, they all come to be 'present and effective at the same time' ,9 overlaying and undermining each other, just as remnants of different historical periods can be found within the time can only be made visible by means of movement in determinate units of space ' (Koselleck 2000, p. 9) . 4 In the former case of indifference, such a theory's primary reference would be to the autonomous duration and rhythm internal to any historical time, rather than their positioning vis-à-vis other times; it could thus be regarded as similar to Herder's suggestion (repeatedly recalled by Koselleck) that there are 'at any one time in the universe innumerably many times' , as everything has its own immanent temporal measure (cited in Koselleck 1979, p. 323 
